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Abstract: In the USA there have been calls for greater conformity 
between the rules producing tax accounts and those used for 
financial reporting purposes. A number of benefits are claimed for 
this so-called ‘book-tax conformity’, including reduced compliance 
costs and better opportunities for monitoring. In Europe, the debate 
around use of the financial accounts for tax purposes has arisen 
from a different conceptual starting point as well as differences in 
surrounding circumstances. Linkage between tax and financial 
accounts is common in Europe, although it takes varying forms. 
This does not result in complete book-tax conformity, however, and 
recent developments in accounting may be increasing divergence 
rather than reducing it. Despite the strong arguments in favour of 
conformity, there are also good reasons for some divergences, 
meaning that the most likely outcome in any system, whatever the 
starting point, is partial convergence. The problem with a hybrid 
outcome of this kind is that, at the point of divergence, there can be 
conceptual confusion and difficulties in integrating and managing 
two conceptually very different rule systems. Clarity of the 
relationship between the rules and improved accounting disclosure 
requirements might be more important than convergence, and might 
be achieved with less distortion to either tax or financial accounting.  
The current UK position is used to illustrate these points. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: KEY ISSUES 
 
It may seem logical to argue that having separate systems for financial 
accounting and for tax accounting leads to obfuscation and confusion and 
thus detracts from good corporate governance. Total convergence of 
accounting methods for both purposes might seem to promise an increase of 
transparency and to simplify compliance. There is a persuasive argument 
that, if there were a single method of accounting for tax and financial 
reporting, pressures to increase reportable profits for the markets on the one 
hand, and to minimise taxation on the other, might balance each other to 
create a healthy equilibrium in listed companies and produce a set of figures 
closer to ‘true’ profits than results from separated systems.  
 
Prima facie this is convincing, but there is a flaw. If total conformity could 
be achieved then some benefits might accrue, although other problems would 
arise as explained below. Most important, however, is the point that the 
most likely consequence of attempting to introduce book-tax conformity is 
partial rather than complete convergence.  There is a danger that purported 
convergence with exceptions could be confusing. Separate rules could be 
preferable to a system that purports to integrate two sets of rules but does so 
without clarity.  Far from removing opportunities for manipulation, the 
interaction of two systems based on very different concepts and cultures 
could increase the available opportunities for obfuscation. There might be 
issues about the scope of a specific tax rule and of the corresponding 
accounting practice, or concerning the applicability or interpretation of an 
accounting rule in a tax context. Each system might use ‘different criteria of 
validity, different forms of authority and different codes for deriving meaning 
from and assessing the value of information.’1 
 
Moreover, in the European context it is misleading to see the options and 
contrasts as being simply between financial accounting and tax accounts. 
This is because many jurisdictions have both national accounting standards 
 
1 M. King and C. Thornhill , Niklas Luhmann’s Theory of Politics and Law, ( Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003).  
and International Financial Accounting Standards (IFRS).2 In other words, 
there may be divergence between different types of accounting standard as 
well as between tax accounting and financial accounting. There are always 
several possible ways of calculating a profit and the method adopted by the 
relevant standard will reflect policy choices made by the standard setters.3 
The differences in accounting standards have come to the forefront in the 
debate in Europe, due to the adoption of IFRS by the EU.4 The result is that 
the US and the European debates have a very different flavour. While a key 
issue in the USA is whether book-tax conformity would be an aid to 
improved corporate governance,5 in most European countries the debate on 
the use of accounting standards for tax purposes centres on the suitability of 
accounting standards as a method of defining the tax base; perhaps even as a 
mode of harmonising the computation of taxable profits across Europe.6  
 
In the UK there is considerable degree of conformity between tax and 
financial accounts but there are major exceptions, so that the ultimate 
                                                 
2 IFRS as used here should be taken to include International Accounting Standards (IAS). The 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) publishes its Standards in a series of 
pronouncements called IFRSs. It has also adopted the body of Standards issued by its predecessor, the 
Board of the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC). Those pronouncements continue 
to be designated "International Accounting Standards" (IASs).  
3 Peter Miller,’ Accounting as Social and Institutional Practice: an Introduction’,   in Accounting as 
Social and Institutional Practice (A Hopwood and P Miller eds.) (Cambridge University Press 1994) at 
p 13. 
4 The IAS Regulation (EC)1606/2002  was adopted on 19 July 2002 by the European Parliament and 
the Council - http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002R1606:EN:NOT 
It sets out a procedure for the adoption of IAS by the Commission and sets out the purposes for which 
the standards are to be used by companies in the Member States. 
5  For some of the literature on this debate see A. Knott & J. Rosenfeld “Book and Tax: A Selective 
Exploration of Two Parallel Universes” (pts 1 &2) (2003) 99 Tax Notes 865 and 1043; M. Desai,  ‘The 
Degradation of Reported Corporate Profits’, SSRN June 2005 available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=758144  and M. Desai and D. Dharmapala, ‘Taxation and Corporate 
Governance: An Economic Approach’ 2008,  in this volume;  M. Hanlon and T. Shevlin, Book-Tax 
Conformity for Corporate Income: An Introduction to the Issues (2005) NBER Working Paper No 
11067; George Plesko and Lillian Mills ‘Bridging the Reporting Gap: A Proposal for more Informative 
Reconciling of Book and Tax Income’ (2003) 56 National Tax Journal 4; Joint Committee on Taxation 
(US) (Staff Report), Present Law and Background Relating to Corporate Tax Reform: Issues of 
Conforming Book and Tax Income (May 8, 2006). http://www.house.gov/jct/x-16-
06.pdf#search=%22staff%20of%20joint%20committee%20on%20taxation%20book%20tax%20confor
mity%22; Walker, David I., "Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior" (March 29, 2006). Boston 
Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 06-05 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=894002 
6 See W. Schoen, ‘International Accounting Standards – A “Starting Point” for a Common European 
Tax Base?’ (2004) 44 European Taxation 426; W. Schoen – “The Odd Couple: A Common Future for 
Financial and Tax Accounting?” (2005) 58 Tax Law Review 111 (Schoen 2005); J. Freedman, 
“Aligning Taxable Profits and Accounting Profits: Accounting Standards, Legislators and Judges” 
(2005) 2 eJournal Tax Research 7 (Freedman 2005). See also the debate on a Common Consolidated 
Corporate Tax Base, discussed below. 
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position is one of partial conformity.7  This gives scope for a gap between the 
profits stated for financial reporting purposes and the amount of tax actually 
paid. Whether and to what extent this is an indicator of avoidance activity is 
tied up with the vexing question of what amounts to tax avoidance and the 
extent to which tax avoidance (as opposed to illegal evasion) is undesirable 
and ‘unacceptable’.8 There are no official published figures in the UK on this 
‘gap’. The Tax Justice Network (TJN) reports that the UK’s fifty largest 
companies have paid an average of 5.7% less corporation tax than ‘expected 
rates’ from 2000 to 2004, but much depends upon what is ‘expected’ and 
some of the  assumptions made are questionable. In particular the TJN refer 
to ‘excessive corporate tax allowances given to encourage investment in plant 
and machinery, resulting in high levels of deferred taxation’.9 Capital 
allowances (accelerated depreciation) are an example of the various express 
tax reliefs and incentives which are considered by most governments to be 
desirable in the context of their economic policies.  Similarly, a recent report 
of the National Audit Office that around 220 of the UK’s 700 largest 
companies paid no tax at all in 2005-6 led to concerns expressed in the media 
that there were high levels of corporate tax avoidance.10 Whilst this has some 
substance, the reasons for this might be, in part at least, that the companies 
concerned were benefiting from intentional reliefs and incentives. If some of 
the gaps arise from deliberate differences between the tax base and the 
definition of profit for financial accounting purposes, care must be taken in 
using this gap in too crude a way as a proxy for tax avoidance activity.  The 
US literature adopts more sophisticated methods for arriving at the book-tax 
gap, making adjustments for differences caused by differential treatment of 
depreciation, for example, but care is still needed in making assumptions 
about the reasons for any differences.11  
                                                 
7 The UK system is described further below. 
8 For further discussion of this problem see J. Freedman, ‘The Tax Avoidance Culture: Who is 
Responsible?’  in J. Holder and C. O’Cinneide (eds) Current Legal Problems 2006 (OUP, 2007). 
9Tax Justice Network, Mind the Tax Gap (The Tax Gap Limited 2006).  
10 National Audit Office, HM Revenue & Customs Management of large business Corporation Tax, HC 
614 Session 2006-2007, (The Stationery Office) July 2007; Footnote 10 ‘One-third of biggest UK 
businesses pay no tax’ Vanessa Houlder  Financial Times August 28th 2007. 
11 For a much more sophisticated use of the book-tax gap to construct a proxy for tax avoidance in the 
USA, which attempts to isolate only that part of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting 
accruals- see M. Desai and D. Dharmapala, ‘Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives’ 
Journal of Financial Economics 79 (1): 145; M. Desai and D. Dharmapala,   2008 (fn 3 above). The 
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 There may be good reasons why complete book-tax conformity cannot, and 
even should not, be achieved, as discussed below. Stronger disclosure 
requirements and better education of those who analyse accounts, so that 
any differences can be properly understood, might be a more fruitful way 
forward than arguing for greater conformity in the USA as well as in Europe.  
 
 
2. CONFORMITY OF FINANCIAL AND COMMERCIAL ACCOUNTS: 
IN SEARCH OF ‘TRUE PROFIT’. 
 
Conformity- the issues 
There are arguments in favour of alignment, based on simplicity and 
convenience. If there was only one profit figure and no adjustments were 
needed, compliance costs would be saved. These benefits would be 
significantly reduced if complete conformity could not be achieved, since 
some adjustments would then be needed and the simplicity of one figure 
would disappear immediately. There could be reductions in compliance costs 
in some areas if only one set of records was needed, and in relation to certain 
types of transaction where very complex records are required this may be an 
overriding consideration.12 Overall, however, if there are good reasons for 
divergence of financial and tax accounts, arguments based on convenience 
should not be allowed to distort the tax base so that problems of another 
kind are produced, such as lack of equity or impracticality of collection. 
 
The more fundamental arguments are those relating to the nature of profits 
and their definition. Underlying the views of those who would conform book 
and tax accounts is the notion that we can achieve an optimal definition of 
profit: one which brings us closer to ‘true economic profit’ than other 
definitions.  This is a questionable assumption, since the proper definition of 
                                                                                                                                            
difficulties involved in producing these figures are discussed in depth in Hanlon and Shevlin, fn 3 
above.    
12 In the UK, many financial institutions have chosen to follow accounts for tax purposes in relation to 
hedging transactions even though they have been given a choice by the legislation to deviate from that 
treatment since it was thought by many to result in volatility which was not appropriate for taxation 
purposes.  See text to n 64 below.  
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profit depends to some extent on the purpose for which it is to be used.13 
Does the profit figure need to be historical or forward-looking? Is the 
business continuing as a going concern or is the issue its break-up value? In 
each case valuations will need to be carried out differently.  
 
The objectives of commercial accounts and of tax accounts may well differ. 
Tax must raise revenue and do so equitably and efficiently as between 
taxpayers. These requirements point to the need for reasonably objective 
rules that take account of taxable capacity and administrative efficiency and 
provide a workable set of rules on the basis of which tax can be calculated 
and – importantly- collected. For example, to operate fairly and efficiently, it 
is often argued that a tax system must recognise ability to pay and subject 
the taxpayer to tax when it is most convenient to pay the tax.14  These 
concepts are linked to the realisation principle, since without liquid assets 
there is an obvious difficulty in paying taxes. Whilst in a perfect market this 
problem of liquidity might be met by borrowing by the taxpayer against 
unrealised profits, in practice financing taxes in this way not only creates 
transaction costs but can also be risky as the value of the security for the 
borrowing may fall. For this reason, the realisation principle seems more 
important for tax purposes than it is for accounting purposes, particularly as 
we move towards fair value accounting, as discussed below.15 The volatility 
inherent in fair value accounting reflects volatility in the market and so, 
arguably,16 should be reflected in the commercial accounts. It is less clear, 
both from the point of view of the taxpayer and the government, that it is 
sensible to tax on the basis of volatile accounts. In addition, tax accounts are 
affected by the facts that tax avoidance opportunities must be blocked and 
that governments may want to use the tax system to deter or incentivise 
                                                 
13 See Miller, fn 2 above; J. R. Hicks, ‘Maintaining capital intact: a further suggestion’, Economica IX 
(1942) 174-79 cited in G. Macdonald, ‘HMRC v William Grant & Sons Distillers Ltd and Small 
(Inspector of Taxes) v Mars UK Ltd: accountancy practice and the computation of profit’ [2007] British 
Tax Review 366. 
 14 Adam Smith’s Canons of Taxation, Adam Smith, The Nature & Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 
Book V, Chap. 11, Part II “Of Taxes", paras. 1-7. 
15 Deborah Schenk argues that the justifications for the realization rule are not as persuasive as has 
been thought, but even she agrees that there are valuation and political difficulties in taxing paper 
gains, making it difficult to abandon realization as a basis for taxation; D. Schenk, ‘A Positive Account 
of the Realization Rule’ (2004) 57 Tax Law Review 355. 
16 Though some would argue not, see below. 
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certain behaviour and for public policy purposes, for example in disallowing 
certain expenses. 
 
Financial accounts, on the other hand, need to give a range of relevant and 
reliable figures to a variety of stakeholders. To achieve this, accounting 
standards often give guidance rather than detailed rules and make available a 
range of options to be applied according to the judgment of the company 
directors (advised by their auditors). Figures in accounts may be augmented 
by notes; a method which cannot assist in the case of taxation, where a 
definitive figure is required. IFRSs/IASs give primacy to the balance sheet 
rather than the profit and loss account: the profit and loss account looks set 
to disappear altogether.17  This contrasts with the obvious needs of any tax 
system based on profit18 to have a profit and loss account, which is charged 
on a periodic basis. It may be possible to carry losses or other allowances 
forwards and back from one period to another, but essentially each period is 
taken in isolation because taxation needs to operate in this way to be 
manageable. This means that tax accounts take an historical perspective and 
are concerned with the profits and losses in an (artificial but important) 
period.  
 
 In each case the differing objectives are perfectly valid, but the functions 
performed by the accounts for these two purposes dictate some differences, 
despite a central core of similarity. Further, in addition to the need to keep 
each system true to its objectives, it needs to be robust against any pollution 
by considerations more relevant to the other system. At present, 
international and US accounting standard setters pay little regard to tax 
implications. They would be unlikely to take kindly to the suggestion that 
they needed to add this issue to the list of considerations and pressures they 
must take on board already.19 Commercial accounting considerations could 
                                                 
17  See A. Wilson (2001) ‘Financial Reporting and taxation: marriage is out of the question’ British Tax 
Review 86; Ron Paterson, ‘A taxing problem’, (2002) Accountancy November 94. 
18 Of course it could be argued that a tax system based on expenditure or some other base would be 
preferable to one based on profit, particularly in view of the difficulties experienced in defining profit 
and locating it. Clearly then this issue of alignment would be seen very differently, but this is outside 
the scope of this article. 
19 Wilson, fn. 13 above; Christopher Nobes A Conceptual Framework for the Taxable Income of 
Businesses, and How to Apply it under the IFRS, (2003,  ACCA, London) p.38. 
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be distorted by tax pressures and this might have the perverse effect that 
even less information was released to the markets because those fearing tax 
consequences would oppose the establishment of standards that suited 
commercial purposes but that would result in a higher tax payment. A 
similar point is made by Hanlon and Shevlin.20  They argue that in a US 
context, conformity would result in greater control by Congress rather than 
the independent Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB),21 and that 
the conformed measure would be closer to the current measure of taxable 
income than the financial reporting measure, thus depriving the markets of 
information. This relates to an important constitutional point that will be 
discussed further later. Who is to control the tax base, the legislature or the 
accounting standard setters? 
 
2.1. The nature of profits 
The idea that a gap between taxable profits and book profits reveals tax 
avoidance activity, as discussed in the introduction above, suggests that book 
profits are somehow closer to the economic profits upon which tax should be 
paid than are the taxable profits. This is a questionable assumption given 
that the special rules for computing taxable profits have been devised to 
reflect policy decisions about what ought to be taxed. It is true that the US 
literature on the implications of the book-tax gap has attempted to allow for 
that by removing certain differences such as depreciation, and still finds a 
residual difference, but it is very hard to be sure that that is not also the 
result, at least in part, of deliberate policy decisions about the tax base 
rather than exploitation of technical loopholes.22 
 
It may also be the case that there are some areas where accounting standards 
can result in figures which are less reliable than tax figures.  So, in a US 
context, following the WorldCom and Enron scandals, the Wall Street 
Journal of January 29th 2003 stated that ‘Profits reported to the IRS, where 
                                                 
20 Fn. 3 above. 
21 For details of the US standard setting structure see Knott and  Rosenfeld  fn 5 above. 
22 See material cited at fn 11 above. 
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firms have less discretion in making calculations, are considered to be closer 
to the truth [than financial accounting profits]…’23  
 
 Developments in accounting standards both in Europe and in the USA are 
attracting serious questions about the reliability of the figures being 
produced under new standards. Fair value accounting is particularly 
problematic and continues to be the subject of heated debate in the 
accounting world.24  IFRSs require fair value accounting, as opposed to 
historic cost accounting, in a number of areas, especially in relation to 
financial instruments, as do standards recently introduced in the USA. 25 
Further work is under way, led by the IASB, to improve guidance and 
disclosures on fair value and for IASB and the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board in the US to produce converged standards and so 
modifications may occur. 26 At present, however, the critics of the standards 
argue that fair value accounting leads to difficulties in measurement (where 
there is no market) and to volatility of profits.27Fair value accounting also 
has other curious consequences; for example, if the creditworthiness of a 
company falls, the market price of its bonds drops, so that these are written 
down in the balance sheet with a resulting profit in the profit and loss 
account, despite the fact that the company is still liable on the full amount 
of the bond.28 Sir Michael Rake, the former head of KPMG and now 
Chairman of BT has urged standard setters to slow the pace of change and 
to be careful about rushing into fair value accounting, saying that  
‘Moving to fair value is going to require a high degree of subjectivity, which 
will mean less direct comparability [between companies].’29 
                                                 
23 Cited in Plesko and Mills (2003) fn 3 above. 
24 J. Hughes, ‘What do users really want from “fair value” accounting? Financial Times 13 September 
2007. 
25 IAS 39; Statement on Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 157 and  SFAS 159, effective for 
fiscal years beginning after 15 November 2007. 
26 IASB, Fair Value Measurements Discussion Paper, 2006, 
http://www.iasb.org/Current+Projects/IASB+Projects/Fair+Value+Measurements/Fair+Value+Measur
ements.htm 
27 There was strong resistance to IAS 39 in Europe for this reason, spearheaded by French banks: Roger 
Murray and Larissa Clark (2003) ‘IAS 39, cash flow hedges and tax’ 8 Financial Instruments Tax and 
Accounting Review 1; Andrew Parker (2003) ‘Compliance costs soar for new IAS rules’ Financial 
Times November 24th. This forced an amendment of IAS 39 by the IASB to enable the European 
Commission to adopt the standard. 
28 Hughes, fn   above.  
29 J. Hughes, ‘Former KPMG head calls for fix in system’ Financial Times October 11 2007.  
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 So, although the accounting profession has expertise in defining profit, it does 
not necessarily lead to universally agreed figures. Indeed in a report in 
November 2006 the Chief Executive Officers of the major auditor networks 
stated that ‘Today’s rules can produce financial statements that virtually no-
one understands.’30  
 
The fact that there is not one definitive set of figures representing ‘true’ 
profit does not entirely deal with the argument that having one set of figures 
would be better than having two. It is arguable that some kind of  middle 
way might be achieved through the balance of the competing pressures to 
ensure that financial accounts show high earnings and healthy balance sheets 
whilst tax accounts take a very prudent view of taxable profits. The hope 
would be that this would reduce avoidance opportunities31 but the problem 
might be that the resulting composite set of accounts might lose some of its 
efficacy both for tax and for financial accounting purposes. The resulting lack 
of information to the market and obfuscation of detail might actually open 
up avoidance opportunities instead of removing them.32 
 
This is not to say that tax and financial accounting should operate in 
isolation from each other. The financial accounts will always be the starting 
point for taxable profits.  There are justifiable differences, however, reflecting 
government policy and differences between the nature of the tax base and 
the informational purposes of financial accounting. Rather than arguing for 
conformity, which would then be the subject of exceptions so leaving the 
position unclear, it would be better to accept that there are differences and 
to make these explicit and rooted in established principles. 
 
 
                                                 
30 See Global Capital Markets and the Global Economy: A Vision From the CEOs of the International 
Audit Networks November 2006 available at 
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/dtt_CEOVision110806(2).pdf 
31 This seems to be the assumption of the UK Government in their consultation papers on Corporation 
Tax Reform, supporting alignment: Inland Revenue and H.M. Treasury (2002) Reform of Corporation 
Tax (London); Inland Revenue and H.M. Treasury (2003) Reform of Corporation Tax, London. 
32 See Hanlon and Shevlin, fn 3 above. 
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3. TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS: NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS, THE 
EU AND IFRS 
 
The financial accounts are a starting point when drawing up the tax 
accounts in any jurisdiction. Although systems vary, it is important not to 
draw too sharp a dividing line between different approaches or to be over-
simplistic in the characterisation of these systems. It is customary to divide 
European jurisdictions between those where there is dependence and those 
where there is independence.33  In 1996, in a comparative study, 
Hoogendoorn reported a ‘clear recent development towards more 
independence between accounting and taxation’ especially in Scandinavian 
and Eastern European countries.34  At the same time, there have been some 
apparent movements towards greater dependence, in the UK for example. 
The overall movement seem to be towards partial alignment. The 
stereotypical extreme cases do not seem ever to have been entirely accurate 
and are becoming less so. 
 
Given this move towards a middle way, three key questions arise. First, how 
and to what extent are the financial accounts modified for tax purposes? 
Secondly, which financial accounting standards are relevant for tax purposes 
and what difference is made by the adoption of IFRS? Thirdly, what are the 
constitutional implications of following accounting standards for tax 
purposes, whether they be national or international standards? These 
questions are distinct and yet intricately related.  
 
3.1. To what extent are financial accounts modified for tax purposes and 
how?   
Most countries, even the USA, which has the ‘most advanced separation 
between different sets of books’, 35 have a residual rule that the commercial 
accounts will be followed if there is not a rule of some kind to the contrary. 
                                                 
33 Martin N. Hoogendoorn (1996) ‘Accounting and Taxation in Europe- A Comparative Overview’, 
l.5 Supplement 783. 
005) fn 6  above. 
The European Accounting Review Vo
34 Hoogendoorn 1996 , ibid.  
35 See Schoen (2
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36 Sometimes the modifying rule has to be statutory but in other 
jurisdictions, such as the USA, it can arise from the case law.37  
                                                
 
In the past the UK was sometimes seen as an example of a jurisdiction where 
the approach was one of independence, but this was never the case and, 
arguably the element of alignment has recently been strengthened by statute 
and case law.38 As discussed further below, the interesting issue in the UK 
now is to what extent, if at all, the commercial accounts are subject to 
principles of law not derived from statute. There have always been statutory 
differences between tax and commercial accounts in the UK, but it was at 
one time thought that there might also be general principles of tax law to 
which commercial accounting was subject. There are some judicial 
statements to support this but also many which do not. 39 The starting point 
is certainly generally accepted accounting practice, which includes IAS/IFRS 
where these standards are being used.40 There are, however, various statutory 
modifications. These range from fundamental differences in regime, as in the 
areas of depreciation and capital gains, to adjustments, as in the areas of 
financial instruments taxation or finance leasing.  
 
In Germany, generally seen to be at the other extreme from the USA as a 
jurisdiction where there is a strong linkage, the close connection between 
commercial or financial accounts and tax accounts is manifested not only in 
the ‘Massgeblichkeitprinzip’ which means that commercial accounting rues 
are binding for tax purposes but perhaps even more importantly on the 
‘umgekehrte Massgeblichkeit’ principle, or reverse conformity, which allows 
tax rules to influence commercial accounts and results in very conservative 
profit figures for all purposes. 41  
 
36 IRC§ 446(a). 
37 Thor Power Tool Co. v Commissioner 439 US 522 (1979) and see Schoen, fn   above. 
38 Discussed below. 
39 For some cases where the courts have not followed accounting practice in assessing taxable income  
see Minister of National Revenue v Anaconda [1956] AC 85; Sharkey v Wernher [1956] AC 58; BSC 
Footwear Ltd v Ridgway 1971 2All ER 534 (HL); Willingale v International Commercial Bank Ltd. 
[1978] 1 All ER 754; however there is debate about the rationale for some of these decisions. 
40 Section 42 Finance Act 1998 as amended by section 103 (5) 2002 Finance Act , section 50 of the 
Finance Act 2004 and  section 25 of the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income ) Act 2005. 
41 N. Herzig, ‘Tax versus Commercial Accounting in Germany’ in P. Thorell (ed) The Influence of 
Corporate Law and Accounting principles in determining Taxable Income , IFA Congress 1996, Vol. 
21b, (The Hague, Kluwer, 1996). 
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 Even in Germany, however, there has never been total conformity and 
Schoen comments that the number of adjustments since the late 1990’s has 
been increasing, often in an effort to increase revenue.42 Similarly, in Sweden, 
which is sometimes classified as having strong linkage, certain types of asset, 
that is financial instruments and real estate, are taxed on a realisation basis 
on capital gains tax principles, whilst other types of asset such as stock in 
trade, construction contracts, machines and equipment are covered by special 
tax rules. 43  In the Netherlands, on the other hand, where there is no formal 
link between tax accounts and financial accounts, the Supreme Court ruled 
many years ago that commercially accepted methods of calculating profits 
are acceptable as methods of calculating taxable profit unless the spirit of the 
tax legislation suggests otherwise.44 Once again this results in partial 
conformity. Here, as elsewhere, not only are there legislative modifications to 
financial accounts for tax purposes but also the courts play a role in 
interpreting the requirements of financial accounting and their relationship to 
the  objectives of the taxable concept of ‘profit ‘or ‘income’.  
 
 
3.2. Which accounting standards? 
In some jurisdictions the answer to the question of which accounting 
standards are to be used for tax purposes is straightforward. There may be 
only one set of applicable accounting standards, as in the USA, or it may be 
that IFRS are applicable only to consolidated accounts which are not used 
for tax purposes. In the EU, use of IAS has been mandatory for the 
consolidated accounts of all listed companies since 200545 but various options 
are in use in respect of unlisted companies and single company accounts. 46 In 
the UK and the Netherlands, to take two examples, all companies are 
permitted to use IAS for not only their consolidated accounts but also their 
individual accounts. Moreover in the UK there is a reducing difference 
                                                 
42 Schoen (2004) and (2005) above. 
43 C. Norberg, Kari Tikka Memorial Lecture, EATLP Helsinki, June 2007. 
44 H.R May 8, 1957, BNB 1957/208- information taken from a questionnaire prepared by Dr. R. Russo 
of Tilburg University. 
45 See fn 4 above. 
46 European Commission: Table on use of IAS in the EU  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/ias/ias-use-of-options_en.pdf 
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between IFRS and domestic standards. A convergence programme is under 
way and it is anticipated that IFRS based UK standards will be operative for 
the financial year commencing January 2009, although for small and medium 
sized companies there would be a simplified Financial Reporting Standard for 
Smaller Entities.47 
 
In a very different mode, Sweden allows IAS to be used only for consolidated 
accounts. Germany permits the use of IAS for individual company accounts 
but only for the purposes of information, and national accounting standards 
continue to apply for tax law and profit distribution purposes. Clearly these 
different approaches mean that the impact of new accounting developments 
has differential effects. In the UK there is a need to confront the new 
approaches and consider whether they are appropriate for tax purposes,48 
whereas in dependence countries like Sweden, as Norberg points out, the 
consequence of new developments in IFRS is that the differences between 
consolidated accounts and annual accounts are increasing.49  
 
This has the curious result in corporate governance terms that the accounts 
used for investor purposes are becoming more detached from those used for 
tax purposes in so-called dependence countries than they are in the UK. The 
remaining focus on dependence in the former countries is not a form of 
alignment that would satisfy the US critics of book-tax divergence. It simply 
produces single level company accounts that deviate from the consolidated 
accounts. This explains why the problem of dealing with new accounting 
standards may be seen as greater in the UK than in the so- called 
dependence countries and may also be a partial explanation of the wariness 
in the UK about the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
proposed by the EU Commission.50 
 
3.3. Constitutional issues. 
                                                 
47 ‘Convergence of UK standards with IFRS’ IASB October 2006 
http://www.frc.org.uk/asb/technical/projects/project0072.html 
48 The UK revenue authority (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC)) has published 
guidance: ‘UK tax implications of international accounting standards.’  
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/practitioners/int_accounting_index.htm- last updated 24th July 2006.  
49 See fn 43 above. 
50 That is not to argue that this is the only reason for UK opposition to the CCCTB. 
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In most of Europe and in the USA, one major concern about using 
accounting standard as a tax base relates to constitutional issues. This is not 
an issue which has caused major concerns in the UK, where in its normal 
pragmatic way, the tax community and government seem to be largely 
unworried about the constitutional issues and the legislature has happily 
incorporated references to generally accepted accounting standards in the tax 
legislation, making it clear that this refers to international accounting 
standards where these are being used.51 In the USA, the issue is one of 
significance, however. Knott and Rosenfeld write, 
 
‘An aligned book-tax system would require one body to be the ultimate 
rulemaking authority. Raising revenue through taxation is such a 
fundamental governmental function that granting principal authority on 
measurement of taxable income to a private sector body such as FASB seems 
untenable’ 52  
 
In many European jurisdictions likewise, the fact that the IASC is a private 
organisation formed by the International Accounting Standards Committee 
Foundation, a not-for-profit Delaware corporation, not under any 
governmental control,53 has raised concerns about the status of IFRS/IAS 
even for accounting purposes, despite the fact that there is a procedure to be 
followed before the EU adopts these standards.  For tax purposes, it would 
seem impossible in many jurisdictions to follow these international accounting 
standards without approval by national parliaments. 54  
 
3.4. CCCTB 
Views emanating from the European Commission on the use of international 
accounting standards as a means to achieve tax harmonisation have shown 
some interesting twists over the past few years. In 2001 an EU Commission 
staff working paper saw globalisation of accounting standards as a catalyst for 
                                                 
51 See fn 40 above. 
52  Knott and  Rosenfeld fn 5  above at p. 1060. 
53 http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/About+Us.htm 
54 See fn 4 above and Schoen (2004)  fn 6  above. 
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the development of harmonised, but independent, tax accounting principles, 
stating that 55 
 
‘Generally, it is clear that there is no prospect of fully matching tax and 
financial accounting in the future…To the extent that tax accounting will 
develop independently from financial accounting, Member States will be 
obliged to find autonomous rules for tax accounting purposes. In looking for 
such rules there is an opening for co-ordination and co-operation to start with 
common base rules, instead of each of the Member States trying to pursue 
individual solutions.’  
 
Subsequently, however, the EU Commission formed the contrary view that 
globalisation of accounting standards might be an opportunity for finding a 
common base for tax across the EU, with a starting point in accounting 
profits, but it always recognised that this was only a starting point and that 
some deviation was likely to be necessary. 56 In 2004, it proposed the use of 
IAS as a tool for designing a common consolidated tax base but stressed that 
the discussions should be guided by  'appropriate tax principles’ and that any 
such base, once established, would not be systematically linked to accounting 
standards as any further development would need to be driven by tax and not 
accounting needs.57  
 
The Commission has now accepted that there can be no formal link between 
the proposed new CCCTB and IAS/IFRS. This is because, as explained 
                                                 
55 EU Commission staff working paper (2001) Company Taxation in the Internal Market 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/publications/official_doc/IP/ip1468/company_tax_study_e
n.pdf at p.324. 
56 For example the European Commission in its proposals for a consolidated tax base: see European 
Commission Consultation Document, ‘The application of International Accounting Standards in 2005 
and the implications for the introduction of a consolidated tax base for companies’ EU-wide activities’ 
(2003) and European Commission, Summary report on results of consultation, (2003) both to be found 
on http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/taxation_customs/taxation/consultations/ias.htm; Communication 
from EU Commission (2003) (COM 2003 726 final) An Internal Market without company tax 
obstacles: achievements, ongoing initiatives and remaining challenges, http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0726en01.pdf 
57 Commission Non-Paper to informal Ecofin Council, 10 and 11 September 2004  ‘ A common 
consolidated EU corporate tax base’ 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/C
CTBWPNon_Paper.pdf  
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above, many Member States do not permit the use of these international 
accounting standards for tax purposes. Thus companies would start from 
accounts prepared in accordance with a number of different national 
generally accepted accounting principles and then make adjustments towards 
the tax base as defined by the European Directive. This European base 
would make some references to IFRS/IAS but with many tax adjustments, so 
in each case the company concerned would need to adjust its individual 
company accounts to arrive at this base. 58  Thus we can see that, whether 
or not the CCCTB is a worthwhile experiment in the use of accounting ideas 
to move towards a harmonised tax base in Europe, it is not going to produce 
one set of accounts for all purposes.  In fact in some jurisdictions the move 
will be towards three sets of accounts: consolidated accounts based on 
IAS/IFRS; individual company accounts based on national generally 
accepted accounting practice, and the CCCTB accounts. It is hard to see 
how this will improve simplicity or transparency, unless the hope is that it 
will result in modification to national generally accepted accounting 
practices. It should be noted that the individual company accounts will have 
uses in some jurisdictions related to distributions as well as to taxation. Thus 
the comment by Desai in his testimony to a US Senate Committee  that the 
European Union is contemplating ‘aggressive conformity of tax and 
accounting rules’ perhaps oversimplifies the position.59 
 
 
 4. THE UK – PROBLEMS WITH PARTIAL CONFORMITY 
 
4.1. Current position 
There is now a considerable degree of conformity between tax and financial 
accounting in the UK, but there are many instances of statutory divergence. 
The UK has a separate system entirely from income tax for capital gains and 
                                                 
58 European Commission CCCTB Working Group, Possible Elements of a Technical Outline, 
CCCTB/WP057\doc\en 26 July 2007. 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/C
CCTBWP057_en.pdf 
59 Testimony of Mihir A. Desai, before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs U.S. Senate June 5, 2007 
http://www.people.hbs.edu/mdesai/DesaiTestimony060507.pdf 
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this is governed by special statutory rules rather than accounting practice.60 
Depreciation is also dealt with by completely separate tax provisions. 61 
 
For corporations there has been some movement away from the capital/ 
revenue divide and towards accounting practice, especially in the area of loan 
relationships, derivatives and intangible fixed assets, but the fundamental 
distinction remains. 62 Even where there is legislation based on accounting 
practice there are some deviations from accounting practice for tax purposes; 
for example if the accounting practice is not  considered to be sufficiently 
robust to prevent tax avoidance.63 Thus new divergences are created from a 
starting point of conformity.  
 
Alternatively the legislation may require conformity with accounting 
standards but it may then be decided to permit deviations because 
conformity turns out to be inappropriate. For example, IFRS hedge 
accounting has proved to be unsuitable for tax purposes because IFRS 
follows a mixed model; using fair value for some assets and some not. There 
can be an accounts mismatch despite the existence of a commercial hedge 
and the hedge accounting rules in IFRS do not cover every case. Since the 
changes go to the profit and loss account, this can prove problematic. 
Therefore, tax rules were introduced to reduce tax volatility by disregarding 
fair value movements on certain contracts for tax purposes. 64  However it 
was then found that these special tax rules created compliance costs for some 
taxpayers, who preferred to use IAS despite its flaws rather than keeping 
special records and so these taxpayers were then permitted to elect out of the 
special tax rules. Hence, from a position of conformity, a very complex 
                                                 
60 The Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992.  
61 Capital Allowances Act 2001. Accounting standards are also irrelevant to tax deductions for share 
based payments as these are governed by specific legislation in Schedule 23 Finance Act 2003. 
62 Corporate debt and currency accounting (Finance Act 1996 as amended by Finance Act 2002); 
derivatives (Schedule 26 Finance Act 2002); intangibles (Schedule 29 Finance Act 2002). See G. 
MacDonald and D. Martin, ‘Taxing Corporate Gains: Proposals for Reform’, [2005] British Tax 
Review 628 for proposals to further align capital gains taxation with corporation tax. These proposals 
have not been adopted to date.  
63 For an example see the Finance Act 2006 definition of funding leases which goes beyond the 
accounting definition of finance lease: R. Carson, Traditional Equipment Leasing, The Tax Journal 23 
October 2006, 11.  
64 The Loan Relationships and Derivative Contracts (Disregard and Bringing into Account of Profits 
and Losses) Regulations 2004 (SI 2004/3256) as amended. 
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situation arose in which taxable profits might or might not diverge from 
financial profits, depending upon a taxpayer election. Despite the appearance 
of greater conformity, neither full alignment nor simplicity has been 
achieved. 
 
In the case of statutory deviations, the position may be complex but at least 
the rules are stated. The situation is more complex where case law is 
concerned. Most of the text books will now take their starting point on the 
question of conformity as being section 42 of the Finance Act 1998 as 
amended. This states that 
 
‘…the profits of a trade, profession of vocation must be computed in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting practice, subject to any 
adjustment required of authorised by law in computing profits for those 
purposes’. 65 
 
Generally accepted accounting practice is defined to mean IFRS/IAS, where a 
company is making up its accounts in accordance with IAS, and UK generally 
accepted accounting practice (GAAP) in other cases66 but, as explained 
above, these standards  are converging in any case.  
 
Clearly the provision permits statutory modification of accounting standards 
for tax purposes, but the extent to which case law can provide such 
modifications is unclear. Section 42 was not supposed to alter the law, 67 but 
even before it was introduced the evidential value of formally decided 
accounting standards was becoming increasingly persuasive68 and the 
statutory statement of the position has supported the view held by many 
that the UK had reached a position in which accounting standards would 
always be followed, subject only to statute.  To many commentators this 
position now seems to have been confirmed by the decision of the House of 
                                                 
65 For a more detailed history of the introduction of this provision see Freedman (2004) fn  6 above.  
66 Finance Act 2005 s. 50. 
67 Explanatory Notes to clause 42 Finance (No 2) Bill 1998.(but note that this is unlikely to be taken 
into account by the UK Courts under the rules of statutory interpretation). 
68 See Gallagher v Jones [1993] STC 537other cases discussed in Freedman (2004) fn 6 above. For a 
contrary view see J. Freedman ‘Ordinary Principles of Commercial Accounting- Clear Guidance or a 
Mystery Tour?’ [1993] British Tax Review 468. 
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Lords in Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) v William Grant & 
Sons and Small v Mars UK Limited (here together called the Mars case), but 
even a strong supporter of the view that there are no general principles of 
tax law with the power to modify accounting standards has expressed his 
doubts about the solidity of this position in the long term. 69  Thus, Graeme 
MacDonald in a note on the Mars case states 
 
‘…it does seem from both Lord Hoffmann’s interpretation of section 42 and 
from the dicta that it is said to codify, that intervention in GAAP profit 
computation can only be justified by statute. Nevertheless, can we really 
conclude from this that the Courts will never develop constraints on the 
application of GAAP in computing taxable profits?’70 
 
It is noteworthy that the case of Mars was only decided after a lengthy 
progression through the courts and that, although the court of first instance 
(the Special Commissioners) found for the taxpayers,71 the distinguished 
judges in the  High Court in Mars (an English case)72 and the Court of 
Session in William Grant  (a Scottish case)73 found for HMRC. It was HMRC 
which was arguing that accounting practice should not be followed in this 
instance. Ultimately they lost when the cases were re-joined in the highest 
court, the House of Lords, but the lack of a common view amongst 
distinguished members of the judiciary does suggest that there is still going to 
be scope for argument over the application of accounting standards. It will be 
hard for the judiciary to deny themselves a jurisdiction, especially when the 
issue is one of statutory interpretation or interpretation of a contract, or the 
characterisation of a relationship or the nature of an asset- whether it is 
capital or revenue for example.74 Thus although the courts may state that 
                                                 
69 [2007] UKHL 15. 
70 G. MacDonald, fn 13 above. 
71 [2004] STC (SCD) 253. 
72 [2005] STC 958. 
73 [2006] STC 69 
74 For some examples of such cases see Freedman (2004) fn 6  above.  On the question of  the 
capital/revenue divide being a question of law see the unequivocal statement of Lord Denning in 
Heather v P E Consulting Group Ltd [1972] 48TC293: ‘ The courts have always been assisted greatly 
by the evidence of accountants. Their practice should be given due weight; but the courts have never 
regarded themselves as being bound by it. It would be wrong to do so. The question of what is capital 
and what is revenue is a question of law for the courts. They are not to be deflected from their true 
course by the evidence of accountants, however eminent’.  
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they will follow accounting practice, it will continue to be for them to decide 
what amounts to a correct application of such practice within a tax context. 
 
To understand this debate it is necessary to look back at some previous case 
law.75 The suggestion that there might be some general principles of tax law 
reached their height in the 1970s. So, according to Lord Reid in the House of 
Lords in BSC Footwear v Ridgeway 76  
 
‘The application of the principles of commercial accounting is, however, 
subject to one well established though non- statutory principle. Neither profit 
nor loss may be anticipated..... But it is admitted that this matter is not 
governed by any rigid rule of law. It depends on general principles which 
have been elaborated by the courts for the purpose of ensuring that so far as 
practicable profits shall be attributed to the year in which they were truly 
earned'.’  
 
Note that even this statement of a principle denied the existence of rigid rules 
of law, so that if there was a principle it was one susceptible to change. 
Nevertheless the House of Lords in BSC Footwear (although not in the end 
Lord Reid, who dissented) did refuse to follow accounting evidence. They 
supported a system of stock valuation which they saw as being less artificial 
and unreal than the one used by the taxpayer for financial accounting 
purposes, but this was before the days of fully formulated and 
institutionalised accounting standards. It is interesting to note also that the 
House of Lords in BSC Footwear, sitting in May 1971, did not have put to 
them a comment that has been made in the High Court (a lower court in the 
hierarchy) in November 1970 in Odeon Associated Theatres Ltd v Jones77by 
Pennycuick VC. This judge is often quoted as stating that   
 ‘The concern of the court in this connection is to ascertain the true profit of 
the taxpayer... In so ascertaining the true profit of a trade the court applies 
the correct principles of the prevailing system of commercial accountancy… 
                                                 
75 For a detailed account of the older cases see J. Freedman ‘Profit and Prophets- Law and Accountancy 
on the Timing of Receipts’ (two parts) [1987] British Tax Review 61, 104. 
76 (1972) 47 TC 495 (Lord Reid, dissenting, but not on principles) 
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At the end of the day the court must determine what is the correct principle 
to be applied.’ 
Pennycuick VC also stated, however, that he was unable to accept the 
suggestion that the Court must ascertain the profit of a trade on some 
theoretical basis divorced from the principles of commercial accountancy, 
which he said was an entirely novel contention. Unfortunately the House of 
Lords did not get the chance to comment on that point in BSC Footwear, 
but Lord Hoffmann revived it with his approval in the Mars case in the 
House of Lords. Relying on this, he roundly rejected the view that there have 
ever been fundamental principles of accounting additional to the best 
practice of accountants.78 Nevertheless he did not go so far as to say that the 
courts will always follow an accounting standard.  For those who were 
hoping for a through analysis of the legal position, the Mars case is a 
disappointing one, dealing briefly with the issue and not commenting upon 
the older cases.79 It must be doubted now whether cases such as BSC 
Footwear and Minister of National Revenue v Anaconda80 (where the courts 
rejected the use of LIFO for tax purposes in the UK) would be decided in the 
same way today.81 Almost certainly greater weight would be placed on the 
accounting practice now, since it would be more formalised and 
sophisticated. Nevertheless we do not have certainty on this point and it 
seems highly likely that professional advisers and HMRC will continue to 
argue for deviations where that suits their case. 
 
4.2. The problems with partial conformity 
In the long run, the importance of Mars may lie not in the apparent 
statement of conformity by their Lordships but in the way it reveals the 
                                                                                                                                            
77 [1973] Ch 288, 48 TC 257. (Pennycuick VC at first instance). 
78 Lord Hoffmann at para. 15. 
79 As J. Collins and D. Dixon commented in ‘Open and Shut case?’  The Tax Journal 9 April 2007  6, 
their Lordships made the case seem so simple that they left us with a real problem to understand why it 
ever got as far as it did; this suggests some over simplification of the issues. 
80 [1956] AC 85  
81 Following this decision, LIFO was rarely considered to be good accounting practice either: contrast 
the US where LIFO appears to have been used for tax reasons and attempts to limit this by a statutory 
conformity requirement failed because everyone accepted that this figure would be tax driven and 
accounts provided additional information in other ways- see  D. Shaviro, ‘The Optimal Relationship 
between Taxable Income and Financial Accounting Income: Analysis and a Proposal’ NYU Law & 
Economics Working Paper  No. 07-38 (http://ssrn.com/abstract =1017073).  
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difficulties inherent in partial conformity. One of the difficulties in the case 
can be seen to be the problems experienced by the courts in understanding 
the intricacies of accounting and by those giving accounting evidence in 
understanding the way a lawyer would look at the facts. 82  The simplified 
way in which the House of Lords eventually dealt with the decision is a 
reflection of this and was an entirely predictable outcome according to 
systems theory. The accounting evidence needed to be internalized into a 
form of legal methodology, which follows what the courts understand as good 
accounting practice. 83 The analysis of the accounting standards derives from 
the accounting evidence but is translated into a narrative which interweaves 
statutes, cases and accounting standards and is transformed into a version of 
accounting practice understood from a legal perspective. 
 
What was not brought out in the case at any level of the hearings, or in the 
commentary so far, is the fact that this was not a case about achieving 
conformity at overall. It was about the management of non-conformity, or 
partial conformity. The case related to depreciation in the financial accounts 
and it was agreed by all that this had to be added back into the tax accounts 
at some point, so conformity overall was not the aim. Allowances for capital 
expenditure for tax purposes are available under the Capital Allowances Act 
2001 which is completely separate from accounting depreciation.  The 
question was when the accounting depreciation should be added back in for 
tax purposes (or perhaps when it should be treated as having been 
deducted), so the issue was one of timing only and not whether an amount 
was taxable or not in the long run. In the end this may be seen as the central 
reason why the taxpayer won.  The problem was one of the interaction of the 
statutory prohibition of deduction of depreciation for tax law purposes with 
accounting practice.  
 
                                                 
82 The attempts of the lower courts to introduce their own analysis were subject to a considerable 
amount of criticism from accountants in the professional press but it was mainly accountants who 
commented and, arguably, they did not understand the legal perspective.  See M. Truman, ‘Mars 
barred’ Taxation 30 June 2005; ‘Accounts don’t contain whisky’ Taxation 27th October 2005; M. Parry 
Wingfield, in The Tax Journal 12th and 19th April 2004 and 25th April 2005. 
83 King and Thornhill, fn 1 above and see the discussion of systems theory in Freedman (2004) fn 6 
above at p 96 and below. 
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It was accepted by both sides in the case that UK GAAP provides for the 
inclusion of depreciation as an overhead cost in valuing stock. Thus, applying 
proper accounting practice, stock was valued at a cost figure which included 
an element derived from depreciation and this was the cost carried forward 
in the financial accounts.84 To accountants (and ultimately to the House of 
Lords) it seemed obvious that the part of the depreciation cost carried 
forward as cost of stock had not been deducted in the year of the expenditure 
and so did not need to be added back in until the stock was sold and the 
deduction made.  To HMRC, however, it seemed that the whole depreciation 
figure should have been added back in immediately. In their view, the part 
carried forward took on a different character as income once included in the 
cost of stock.85  The view of the High Court judge in the UK and the 
majority of the Court of Session in Scotland was that the statutory 
prohibition on deduction overrode accounting practice. As Lightman J put it 
 
 “It is not to be expected that Parliament intended that (save as expressly 
provided) any sum deducted in respect of depreciation should avoid being 
added back merely because it was reflected as an item of cost in the figure 
shown for stock.” 86 
 
 
To Lightman J this was a question of statutory construction and therefore 
one of law and not accounting, as was the conversion of the depreciation cost 
into an income cost, issues of capital and income being clearly a question for 
the courts,87 but to the accountants88 and eventually to the House of Lords, 
the decision as to what had actually been deducted was a question of 
accounting principle. To them the amount carried forward had not been 
deducted and so could not be added back. The lawyer representing HMRC in 
the Mars case argued that it was relevant to consider the capital allowances 
legislation. Capital allowances were given without any reduction for 
depreciation carried to stock and so the add back should be for the full 
                                                 
84 Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 9 and 12 and Financial Reporting Statement 15. 
85 As explained by Lightman J [2005] STC 958 at para 39. 
86 [2005] STC 958 at para 36. 
87 See fn 74 above. 
88 See Truman  30th June 2005, fn 82 above.  
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amount of the depreciation.89 This argument, which attempted to look at the 
accounts and tax legislation as a whole, was not remarked upon by the House 
of Lords. In one sense this was understandable, because the capital 
allowances legislation is quite separate from the question of stock valuation. 
The outcome in the House of Lords is widely considered to be correct on the 
facts. On the other hand, the decision to follow the financial accounts for tax 
purposes in one respect whilst it does not govern depreciation more generally 
results in difficulties at the point of interaction as shown by this case and 
does not produce conformity or a simple relationship between the tax 
accounts and the financial accounts.90   
 
This phenomenon can also be seen in other cases also involving the capital/ 
income divide. In Gallagher v Jones,91 although the court purported to be 
following the accounting standard for finance leasing, part of that standard- 
the element which regarded a proportion of rental payments to be capital 
rather than income- was ignored. This was accepted without argument so that 
the relevant standard (SSAP 21) apparently applied in so far as it applied to 
timing, but not in relation to the recharacterisation of a revenue payment as 
capital.92  A fuller (although still not complete) alignment with accounting 
practice had to be achieved subsequently by legislation to produce a coherent 
solution.93 
The consequence of this partial conformity with accounting standards is that 
there is no certainty about when the courts will decide that a matter falls 
within their jurisdiction and when they will follow accounting practice, as we 
can see from the very different views of the judges at different levels in the 
Mars case as just one recent example. The direction from Lord Hoffmann in 
the House of Lords suggests that only legislative qualifications of accounting 
practice are likely to be considered valid, yet this was not fully explored and 
                                                 
89 [2004] STC (SCD)  253 at para 267. 
90 Similarly in the case of Gallagher v Jones, accounting standards were in fact followed only in part – 
see Freedman (1993) fn 68 above. 
91 See fn 68  above . 
92 ibid at p544, line h. In another case dealing with the conversion of rental payments into a capital 
lump sum by way of assignment, the entire question was treated as one of law, to the surprise of the 
dissenting judge in the Court of Appeal, Arden LJ, who thought that the accountancy treatment was a 
relevant consideration: IRC v John Lewis Properties [2003] STC 117. Legislation has not introduced a 
solution to the issue addressed in that case which comes close to the accounting treatment. 
93 Finance Act 2006, Schedule 8 amending Capital Allowances Act 2001. 
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the older cases may yet be raised up by taxpayers or HMRC in the future. 
Even if a legislative provision stated expressly that only statutory deviations 
from accounting practice would be permitted, this would be unlikely to bring 
an end to the uncertainty, since issues of interpretation and scope would still 
arise and the courts would still be inclined to find points of law on which 
they could opine. As now though this would be a partial exercise resulting in 
a hybrid system. Thus there would be a tendency for the courts to seize back 
jurisdiction by finding that the accounting standard was not applicable to 
the situation or by converting the issues into ones with which they were 
familiar, such as the capital/income divide, as discussed above, or a 
contractual or legal ownership question. This might be done by finding that 
there was an issue as to the nature of a payment for tax purposes which 
must be decided as a pre-requisite to deciding whether or not the accounting 
standard applies at all. 94 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE 
 
 It has been argued here that full convergence of commercial and tax 
accounts will not be achieved and should not be the aim. Convergence with 
adaptations to take account of necessary differences might seem to be a 
sensible compromise, but this will bring with it its own difficulties as systems 
which have apparently similar objectives and use similar language in fact are 
based on different principles, making interaction problematic. In particular, 
any notion that there is one true ‘profit’ figure will be an unhelpful over-
simplification. Systems theory suggests that integration of the tax and 
accounting systems is not possible; they are separate ‘closed’ systems which 
inevitably see things differently and this needs to be recognised in policy 
formulation.95 ‘All that one system is able to achieve is an internalization 
according to its own “way of seeing” of what it understands from the 
communications of the other system’.96 As can be seen from the decided 
                                                 
94 For examples of such a response under the present system, see in addition to Gallagher v Jones, the 
cases on ‘judicial gap filling’ discussed in Freedman (2004) at p87 et seq. 
95King and Thornhill  fn  1 above at p26-27; R. Nobles and D. Schiff A Sociology of Jurisprudence 
Hart Publishing Oxford 2006. 
96 King and Thornhill, ibid. 
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cases, the interaction of two very different systems will result in a tendency 
for the courts to simplify accounting principles in order to absorb them into 
a legal decision making process. A judicial decision needs to give a definitive, 
one figure answer to questions that in accounting terms may be dealt with in 
a more nuanced way by use of a package of figures and notes to the 
accounts. In picking and choosing issues on which they will follow accounting 
practice as they see it, the courts may fragment the overall picture, and this 
process, combined with statutory modifications to the commercial accounts 
for tax purposes, is highly unlikely to produce conformity, transparency or 
simplicity.  
 
Despite a starting point of conformity in many European countries, in 
practice there is considerable statutory divergence and this is likely to 
increase rather than decrease if national accounting standards used for tax 
purposes follow the path of IAS/IFRS in the use of fair value accounting and 
other developments that are not easily applicable to taxation. Countries in 
which individual company accounts as used for tax and company law 
purposes vary from IAS/IFRS may not experience this difficulty, but their 
individual company accounts will then not be aligned with their consolidated 
accounts which, at least in the case of listed companies, will be made up 
according to IAS/IFRS. In the UK, where use of IAS/IFR is already 
permitted for individual company accounts and where UK accounting 
standards are converging with IAS/IFRS in any event we see a starting point 
of convergence but many examples of divergence. Issues are arising about the 
point at which questions of law about the nature of receipts and expenses 
might interact with the application of accounting standards. Yet further 
complexities will arise should issues of interpretation of IAS/IFRS reach the 
European Court of Justice, as well they might now these have been adopted 
at European level. Should the CCCTB be implemented, there will be yet 
another layer of accounts which will follow IAS/IFRS in part but not 
completely and further issues of interpretation for the ECJ. 97 There is little 
evidence that Europe is moving towards a simpler system. 
                                                 
97 It has been suggested that a specialist court at EC level might be needed to deal with interpretations 
of accounting standards: Philip Baker  QC at the CCCTB Conference organised by  the German 
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 In the United States, as we have seen, there are calls by some for greater 
conformity in order to prevent tax avoidance and the manipulation of 
financial accounting income. Desai and Dharmapala suggest that there exists 
a relationship between aggressive tax sheltering activity and diversion of 
corporate profits from shareholders and that the opportunities for this could 
be decreased by book-tax conformity and greater transparency.98 For the 
reasons explained here, it is not clear that a sufficient degree of conformity 
could be achieved to ensure the lack of divergence that would be necessary to 
remove these opportunities and it is very unlikely that the degree of 
simplicity these writers hope for would be attained; at least this has not been 
the result in the UK, where complexity remains and there still seems to be a 
gap between taxable and financial accounting profits that is not always easy 
to explain. 99 
 
If the standards regulating financial accounts are designed to bring as much 
information to the market as possible then this must be good for corporate 
governance and it is not desirable to muddy the waters by insisting on 
conformity with the tax accounts. Nevertheless, if there are large differences 
between book and tax accounts which cannot be explained in terms of 
deliberate divergences in the rules there are governance concerns of the type 
described by Desai and Dharmapala.  Greater disclosure of information from 
the tax accounts might be necessary to enable the authorities, analysts and 
researchers to investigate this.  
 
There are various routes to achieving this.100  There could be greater or 
better disclosure to the tax authorities (in the USA through improvements to 
                                                                                                                                            
Federal Ministry of Finance in cooperation with ZEW Centre for European Economic Research and 
Max-Planck-Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law in May 2007. 
98 In this volume (fn 5 above); Desai fn 59  above 
99  See Shaviro, fn 81 above, who considers the difficulties created by conformity make it inferior to 
partial conformity. By this he means, however, a form of partial conformity, this would not be based on 
altering the detailed rules for profit computation but would take the form of an adjustment of the final 
figures. This is a practical proposal to address the tax avoidance problem although the rationale is not 
entirely clear. If it is reasonable to have a tax base which differs from the financial accounting base, 
why should it be justifiable to have an adjustment? See also J. McClelland and L. Mills, ‘Weighing 
Benefits and Risks of Taxing Book Income’ 2007 TNT 35-61- Special Reports.  
100 Presentation on Tax Accounting versus Commercial Accounting, IFA Congress 2006, Helen 
Hubbard (panel member).  
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the Schedule M-3)101 there could be increased disclosure of tax information to 
the public or to agencies regulating the securities markets or there could be 
inclusion of increased disclosure in financial reports with respect to book-tax 
differences.102  The Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) and the US 
Treasury have expressed doubts about the value of disclosure of the entire 
voluminous tax accounts, largely on the grounds that the complexity and 
length of them made them of limited value to the authorities, although 
potentially useful to competitors.  They believe that specific information is 
more useful and this can be requested by the SEC if necessary.   
 
Elsewhere, the effective tax rate is sometimes used by revenue authorities as 
one measure of tax compliance and this requires examination of the 
relationship between the tax and financial accounts, the effective tax rate of 
corporations being the corporation tax liability declared as a percentage of 
pre-tax company profit. This measure is already used in Australia and 
Canada and the UK National Audit Office has recommended that HMRC 
should  
 
‘assess the usefulness  of monitoring businesses’ effective tax rates over 
time, as an indicator of potential compliance risk behaviour and to develop 
better understanding of the drivers behind those rates.’103 
 
The differences between the financial accounts and the tax accounts may be 
based on a good rationale. If so, any cost resulting from having two separate 
figures is likely to be outweighed by the benefits of providing appropriate 
information and figures for the different stakeholders in question. If the 
differences in the accounts are not based on reason but on some form of 
manipulation, the answer seems to lie in ascertaining the causes of this and 
changing whichever set of rules is inappropriate for its purpose. The best way 
to discover why the differences are arising is by improving transparency and 
                                                 
101 Knott and Rosenfeld fn. 5 above (Part II) discuss the issues of publication of tax returns and the 
Schedule M-1 reconciliation of book and tax accounts. See also Gil B. Manzon and George Plesko 
(2002), ‘The Relation Between Financial and Tax Reporting Measures of Income’ 55 Tax Law Review 
175; David Lenter, Joel Slemrod and Douglas Shackleford (2003) ‘Public Disclosure of Corporate Tax 
Return Information: Accounting, Economics and Legal Perspectives’56 National Tax Journal 803.  
102 There are already requirements to account for uncertainty in relation to tax positions under FIN 48 
103 National Audit Office, fn 10 above. 
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disclosure.  The existence of two systems side by side will result in 
complexities and issues of interaction. It should not be assumed that this 
interaction can be managed without legislation, nor that it will be simple, 
even where there is an initial presumption of convergence. 
 
 
 
 
 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation
Working Paper Series
WP07/22 Freedman, Judith, Financial and Tax Accounting: Transparency and
’Truth’
WP07/21 Davies, Ronald B., Norba¨ck, Pehr-Johan and Ayc¸a Tekin-Koru, The Ef-
fect of Tax Treaties on Multinational Firms: New Evidence from Micro-
data
WP07/20 Keuschnigg, Christian and Evelyn Ribi, Outsourcing, Unemployment and
Welfare Policy
WP07/19 Becker, Johannes and Clemens Fuest, Taxing Foreign Profits with Inter-
national Mergers and Acquisitions
WP07/18 de la Feria, Rita, When do dealings in shares fall within the scope of VAT?
WP07/17 Spengel, Christoph and Carsten Wendt A Common Consolidated Corpo-
rate Tax Base for Multinational Companies in the European Union: some
issues and options
WP07/16 de Mooij, Ruud A. and Gae¨tan Nicode`me, Corporate tax policy and in-
corporation in the EU
WP07/15 Zodrow, George R., Capital Income be Subject to Consumption-Based
Taxation?
WP07/14 Mintz, Jack M., Europe Slowly Lurches to a Common Consolidated Cor-
porate Tax Base: Issues at Stake
WP07/13 Creedy, John and Norman Gemmell, Corporation Tax Revenue Growth
in the UK: a Microsimulation Analysis
WP07/12 Creedy, John and Norman Gemmell, Corporation Tax Buoyancy and Rev-
enue Elasticity in the UK
WP07/11 Davies, Ronald B., Egger, Hartmut and Peter Egger, Tax Competition
for International Producers and the Mode of Foreign Market Entry
WP07/10 Davies, Ronald B. and Robert R. Reed III, Population Aging, Foreign
Direct Investment, and Tax Competition
WP07/09 Avi-Yonah, Reuven S., Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage, and the Inter-
national Tax Regime
WP07/08 Keuschnigg, Christian, Exports, Foreign Direct Investment and the Costs
of Corporate Taxation
WP07/07 Arulampalam, Wiji, Devereux, Michael P. and Giorgia Maffini, The Inci-
dence of Corporate Income Tax on Wages
WP07/06 Devereux, Michael P. and Simon Loretz, The Effects of EU Formula Ap-
portionment on Corporate Tax Revenues
WP07/05 Auerbach, Alan, Devereux, Michael P. and Helen Simpson, Taxing Cor-
porate Income
WP07/04 Devereux, Michael P., Developments in the Taxation of Corporate Profit
in the OECD since 1965: Rates, Bases and Revenues
WP07/03 Devereux, Michael P., Taxes in the EU New Member States and the Lo-
cation of Capital and Profit
WP07/02 Devereux, Michael P., The Impact of Taxation on the Location of Capital,
Firms and Profit: a Survey of Empirical Evidence
WP07/01 Bond, Stephen R., Devereux, Michael P. and Alexander Klemm, The
Effects of Dividend Taxes on Equity Prices: a Re-examination of the
1997 UK Tax Reform
